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The concept of borrowing and lending has been around as long as humans have been 
living communally and is indeed part of the social fabric of communities (Seabright, 2004). The 
manifestation of consumers' need to borrow cash for short periods of time came along somewhat 
later, hut the idea of borrowing and lending is as old as the concept of community. Today's 
manifestation of that need is frequently found in the form of short-term cash consumer loans, 
also known as payday loans. 
The payday lending industry has grown from practical non-existence in the early 1990's 
to widespread proliferation today. As of 2001, over 10,000 locations were open nationwide to 
provide payday loans (Caskey, 2001). From 1993 in Kansas alone, over 1,900 payday and title 
lender locations were licensed. According to reporting lenders in Kansas, over $230 million in 
payday and title loans were made to Kansas consumers in 2005 (Office of the State Bank 
Commissioner, n.d.). 
A payday loan transaction generally consists of a consumer writing a post-dated check to 
a lender and receiving a lesser amount of cash in return. This differential amounts to the cost of 
the loan for the proscribed period, usually two weeks. These loans are not inexpensive; a 
consumer who writes a check for $300 to a lender can expect to receive $240 in return (Callahan 
& Mierzwinski, 2005), which amounts to a 521% Annual Percentage Rate (APR). The loan is 
uncollateralized and closed ended. There is no asset pledged or lien applied. There is an effective 
payment schedule, as the consumer's check is cashed at the end of the two week period. If the 
customer does not repay the loan, it can be renewed for another two weeks for another $60. 
This does not seem to be a very good deal for consumers who have short-term cash 
needs. Yet, one intuitively understands that this is not a situation unique to 21st century Kansans. 
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How have short-term consumer cash transactions been handled in the past? What has been the 
role of institutions in regulating these transactions? And what can be done to protect consumers 
from unfair lending practices? This paper will explore these issues from both an historical and a 
policy perspective, and propose solutions for the benefit of consumers today and in the future. 
Lending Policy and Legislation 
Usury laws are the earliest and most common form of policy regulating consumer lending 
and may be considered the oldest form of financial regulation, dating back to the code of 
Hammurabi and transcending religious faiths (Bodenhorn, 2007; Benmelech & Moskowitz, 
2007). Those with free-market inclinations will wonder why interest rates are not set by the 
market, with those who have the means to borrow funds doing so at a market -determined rate. 
However, the very nature of the need to borrow cash for a short-term basis somewhat contradicts 
the market's ability to supply funds. 
The argument that the market will determine interest rates is predicated on each case for 
borrowing assuming a positive net present value (Chakravarty & Scott, 1999). Short-term 
consumer cash borrowing frequently cannot make this claim; in fact, short-term consumer cash 
borrowing may be a matter of starvation or not, particularly in historical cases. In these cases, the 
regulatory power of religious powers, be they Roman Catholic, Islamic or Indian Vedic, have 
grounds for intervention. The Roman Catholic Church's prohibition on usury, parts of which 
were in place until 1830, was the most pervasive on Western Europe and thus most influential on 
the development of consumer lending in this country (Reed & Bekar, 2003). However, the 
admonitions against usury are pervasive throughout other cultures as well. 
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Vedic texts of ancient India dating back nearly 4,000 years made class distinctions 
regarding usury; it was seen as an unfit practice for the upper castes. Over time, usury was only 
condemned is as much as it contradicted the current legal practice. The dilution of the 
admonition continued until it existed only in principle and only applied to practices that are 
outside the bounds of social convention (Visser & Macintosh, 1998). 
Biblical passages in the Judaic texts forbid the practice of usury. The sundry laws of 
Exodus include this passage from Chapter 22, verse 25, New American Standard version, "If you 
lend money to My people, to the poor among you, you are not to act as a creditor to him: you 
shall not charge him interest." However, Deuteronomy 23:20 clears the way for charging interest 
to foreigners. 
Usury in Islamic economic life was criticized during the prophet Mohammed's lifetime 
and is mentioned in his writings. The principle of interest was an established prohibition during 
the reign of the Caliph Ulmar (634- 644). While different branches of Islam have different 
interpretations of the interest prohibition, particularly relating to the difference between 
commercial and consumption loans, there are currently interest -free financial institutions in 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and in North America (Visser & Macintosh, 1998). 
In Christianity, the lessons of the Old Testament were supplemented by those of the New. 
Specifically, Luke 6:34 is cited as a prohibition of usury: "And if you lend to those from whom 
you expect to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, in order to receive 
back the same amount." 
The Roman Catholic prohibition on usury has many economic interpretations; the church 
wished to be a net borrower and enforced a rent -seeking model (Ekelund, Hebert & Tollison, 
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1989), the church as a net lender who wished to operate as a monopoly (Reed & Bekar, 2003), 
the church as a provider of welfare with an interest in rationing credit (Posner, 1995) or 
smoothing consumption (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 1998), or the church as an institution that 
prospered by keeping as much of the population as possible alive, healthy, productive and tithing 
(Reed & Bekar, 2003). 
This last theory of consumption smoothing as a benefit to the church meets several moral 
and economic points. At the height of the Church's usury prohibition in the 13th through 16th 
centuries, there is little correlation between poor harvests and mortality, suggesting that a means 
of consumption smoothing existed. Reed and Bekar (2003) suggest that the Church served as that 
instrument of pooling resources, of collecting during prosperous times and disbursing during 
lean times. The Church benefited from the tithe and from land income. If there was not a healthy 
population to produce the tithe and to work the land for the Church, these benefits dissipated. 
Therefore, the Church worked to balance the income from the land and the tithe with the 
almsgiving necessary to maintain a working population. The poor were excluded from borrowing 
because of the prohibition against usury, complicated by the fact that they had no collateral. The 
wealthy had collateral and the merchant class found it necessary to borrow for trade. So the 
Church was the sole source of charity for the distressed poor through formal pooling of 
resources. By channeling the private capital markets away from consumption loans and into 
trade, the Church secured the loyalty of its subjects by meeting their consumption needs during 
bleak times. 
Benmelech and Moskowitz (2007) discuss another historical case where institutional 
entities, in this case wealthy industrial interests, utilize usury laws to "help" the poor while at the 
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same time maintaining a working class and stifling competition. During the first financial crisis 
in the United States, the Panic of 1819, up to 10% of the population of New York City was 
receiving relief in the form of public assistance, private charity and "stay" laws to postpone 
property foreclosures. Debt relief legislation was proposed and passed in many states. However, 
in no case was the usury law in a state relaxed, allowing the co -existence of policies designed to 
protect the poor and limit entry into the marketplace by marginal contenders. Moreover, in those 
states where debtors had more political power, usury laws were more relaxed than in states 
where they were strictly enforced. 
Consumer v. commercial lending 
It should be noted, however, that the Church made a distinction between consumption 
(consumer) loans and commercial lending, and applied leverage to the pawnbrokers, not the 
bankers. Punishments for usury included exclusion from rites of the church, such as confession, 
absolutions and Christian burial, and excommunication for those rulers of communities that 
profited from the practice of usury (Reed & Bekar, 2003). 
The exchange of views between Adam Smith and his student Jeremy Bentham on the eve 
of the industrial revolution provides insight into the distinction between commercial or merchant 
lending and that for consumption. Philosophers such as Francis Bacon and John Locke had 
considered the issue, going as far as to propose interest rates suitable for each occasion. 
However, Smith, the father of modern economics, "for all his faith in natural liberty, proved 
unwilling to let the interest rate float" (Persky, 2007, p. 228). 
In the United States, knowledge about the business of pawnbroking pales in comparison 
to that of the banking industry. While providing less than 0.1% of consumer loans in the mid- 
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1980's, there were more than twice the retail outlets for pawnshops than for savings and loan 
institutions, which are more targeted to the consumer market than are commercial banks 
(Caskey, 1991). Pawnshops provide an outlet for consumer loans for those who do not have 
sufficient collateral to make use of commercial banking or community savings institutions, and 
for those who participate in the economy using cash only. Their regulation varies from state to 
state and variances in usury laws can at least partially explain this difference. Many payday 
lending locations are collocated with pawnshops, and indeed, payday lending may in some ways 
be seen as an extension of pawnshop services and check cashing businesses (Stegman & Faris, 
2003). 
Truth in Lending 
The passage of the Truth In Lending Act in 1968 was a watershed event in the history of 
consumer credit policy. Prior to this legislation, prospective creditors were not required to adhere 
to standard methods of presenting the terms of credit arrangements to consumers. This 
standardization was manifested in the use of the Annual Percentage Rate, or APR. 
Prior to standardization on the APR, creditors could express interest rates in simple 
terms, compound terms, in terms of dollars only or by translating a fixed price into a series of 
monthly payments. In testimony in front of a Congressional committee, Dr. Richard L. D. Morse 
from Kansas State University stated that consumers had a need for comparable facts about 
alternatives in consumer financing decisions, and that these included four parts of a consumer 
finance charge quotation: 
1. Amount of down payment and monthly payments 
2. Number of months 
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3. Total finance charge 
4. Annual percentage rate 
Dr. Morse felt that providing consumers with fully disclosed information would increase 
consumer confidence in the use of credit. He was also keenly aware of the imbalance of power in 
consumer credit situations; the creditor does this as his daily course of business, but for the 
consumer, these are infrequently made decisions. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all parties 
to protect the consumer and maintain his or her faith in the business practices of vendors. 
Payday lending practices 
The rise of payday lending can be attributed to several factors, including the need for 
check -cashing businesses to find new services to offer as direct deposit services have replaced 
their core business and an increase in the number of consumers whose credit limitations force 
them to seek alternative sources for short-term cash loans (Stegman & Faris, 2003). A payday 
loan is a quick and simple transaction and can be accomplished at a growing number of locations 
that are strategically placed to allow for convenience and avoid competition (Burkey & Simkins, 
2004). Payday loan consumers are also familiar with other forms of credit. According to 
Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001), payday loan consumers are three times more likely than other 
U.S. adults are seriously debt burdened and four times more likely to have filed for bankruptcy. 
Payday loans can be rolled over as quickly and simply as they can be originated. When 
the original loan is due, the consumer can either write a new check for the amount of the loan 
and the new fee, or pay the fee only. This practice can effectively evolve into an interest -only 
loan where regular payments are made, but the principal is never reduced (Stegman & Faris, 
2003). A national survey indicated that 40% of consumers of payday loans renewed at least six 
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loans in the previous 12 months and 10% rolled over loans 14 or more times (Elliehausen & 
Lawrence, 2001). States can pass legislation designed to limit the number and frequency of 
rollovers, however the payday lending companies will soon discover another loophole or new 
innovation to facilitate this highly profitable business segment. A simple and obvious alternative 
is for the consumer to simply to go another payday lender to obtain a loan to cover the first 
obligation (Stegman & Faris, 2003). 
Proposed solutions 
Traditionally, the regulation of banks and other financial institutions has been delegated 
to the individual states. As a result, legislation regarding payday and title lending institutions 
varies widely. According to the Consumer Federation of America, twelve states prohibit payday 
loans through the use of small loan laws or usury caps, although there are some loopholes in the 
laws. In 37 states, payday loans are authorized by either payday loan laws or licensed lender 
laws. Only New Mexico appears to be completely unregulated. In addition, the variety of laws 
and loopholes available in most states means that lenders can keep one step ahead of the next 
legislative session when operating in many states. For example, lenders in Texas took advantage 
of a loophole in 2000 legislation that allowed them to partner with out-of-state financial 
institutions and charge higher rates of interest (Texas Public Interest Research Group (n.d.)). 
In order to protect the most vulnerable consumers, comprehensive federal legislation is 
required to bring all fees and charges associated with short term consumer cash loans by banks 
and fringe financial institutions under a set of uniform regulations. In lieu of federal action, a 
model framework for short-term cash lending should be designed and the individual states 
encouraged to enact conforming legislation. This framework should be developed by consumer 
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advocates, industry groups and governmental entities; for any effort to be successful, all parties 
must be involved. 
Enforcement is the other substantial challenge in the regulatory segment. Because of the 
proliferation of payday lending locations, state regulatory bodies are faced with an increased 
demand for their services, and the effort of keeping up with changing regulations. In addition, 
consumers who have issues with payday lenders may feel embarrassed or intimidated by asking 
for assistance from a governmental entity. The dollar amount of the transactions involved is not 
large, therefore consumers may assume that their complaints will not be given priority by the 
regulating agency. In contrast, state securities regulators are usually dealing with larger, more 
significant transactions and a more sophisticated consumer base. It would be an interesting 
research project to compare the size of state regulatory enforcement agencies in terms of 
personnel associated with securities, banking and payday/title lending fraud. 
According to the website of the Division of Consumer and Mortgage Lending in the 
Kansas Office of the State Bank Commissioner, 10 field examiners are employed to regulate the 
activities of approximately 2,000 lenders. The Office of the Securities Commissioner has a 
similar sized staff and their investigations resulted in 31 actions in 2006. They also have 
department devoted to Investor Education which is funded by fines from violators. 
Policy Implications 
Providing comprehensive financial education through public schools and workplaces 
would lessen demand for payday and title lending services. Consumers with knowledge about 
financial issues and the costs and risks associated with entering various financial transactions are 
more equipped to make sound decisions. This skill set allows them to avoid the situations that 
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lead to the need for payday lending and to provide for contingencies associated with credit card 
lending, home buying and other financial transactions related to daily life. 
Financial products that can compete with payday and title loans could significantly 
impact the demand for these services. By increasing the use of conventional, regulated financial 
institutions in low-income and minority areas, or "banking the unbanked", demand will be 
created for banks, credit unions and thrifts to operate in areas that serve those with low incomes, 
particularly race/ethnic minorities. The advantages to low-income and minority families include 
financial security and access to low cost transactions. Financial security appears in the form of 
insured accounts and regulated costs for services. Low cost transactions occur through the 
leveraged use of technology; Automated Teller Machine (ATM) and on-line transactions are 
available to consumers at a fraction of the cost of traditional person -to -person transactions 
(Smith, 2005). In other words, it is less expensive to pay one's utilities with an ATM card than it 
is to travel to a location that accepts utility payments, stand in line and enact a physical 
transaction. Community organizations working with established financial institutions through 
frameworks such as the Community Reinvestment Act can create critical masses of consumers in 
underserved areas to demand the types of services these institutions offer. 
Regulation could have the most substantial impact on payday lending, but it is also the 
avenue most fraught with challenges in the form of bureaucracy, political complexity and 
conflicting interests. Enforcement as a branch of regulation holds promise and must be examined 
in the light of consumer protection. Governmental entities have the most compelling interest in 
protecting the rights of minority populations. Political power must be brought to bear on those 
who can protect and serve. 
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Conclusion 
If society accepts the concept that no one should have to pay 521% APR to borrow $500 
for two weeks and that a family should not lose the only asset that it has to make a utility 
payment, then action should be taken to regulate payday and title lenders. Local enforcement at 
the state level can have an immediate impact by aggressively investigating and fining violators 
and using those funds for a public service campaign to educate vulnerable investors. This can be 
modeled on the campaign run by the Kansas Office of the Securities Commissioner to prevent 
investor fraud. Long-term help will hopefully come in the form of financial education in our 
schools. 
Creating a demand for fairly priced financial services by encouraging the use of the 
banking system is a way of providing alternatives to payday loans. By offering services in 
underserved communities, conventional financial institutions can increase market share and add 
to profits. Opportunities exist for community organizations and conventional financial 
institutions to work together and create these opportunities. 
Short-term Consumer Cash Loans 13 
References 
Benmelech, E. & Moskowitz, T. (2007). The political economy of financial regulation: Evidence 
from U.S. State usury laws in the 19th century. NEBR working paper series. 
Bodenhorn, H. (2007). Usury ceilings and bank lending behavior: Evidence from nineteenth 
century New York. Explorations in Economic History, 44, 179-202. 
Burkey, M. L. & Simkins, S. P. (2004). Factors affecting the location of payday lending and 
traditional banking services in North Carolina. The Review of Regional Studies, 34, 191- 
205. 
Callahan, S. & Mierzwinski, E. (2005). Preying on Portlanders: Payday lending in the city of 
Portland. Retrieved April 26, 2007 from http://ospirg.org/OR.asp?id2=20549 . 
Caskey, J. P. (1991). Pawnbroking in America: The economics of a forgotten credit market. 
Journal of Money, Banking and Credit, 23, 85-99. 
Caskey, J. P. (2001). Payday lending. Financial Counseling and Planning, 12(2), 1-14. 
Chakravarty, S. & Scott, J. S. (1999). Relationships and rationing in consumer loans. Journal of 
Business, 72, 523-544. 
"Consumer Expert Endorses Truth in Lending," Congressional Record, S. 6164-9, May 2, 1967. 
Consumer Federation of America. (n.d.). Payday loan consumer information: Legal status. 
Retrieved May 1, 2007 from http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/lstatus.cfm 
Ekelund, R. B. J., Hebert, R. & Tollison, R. D. (1989). An economic model of the medieval 
church: Usury as a form of rent seeking. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
5, 307-331. 
Short-term Consumer Cash Loans 14 
Elliehausen, G. & Lawrence, E. C. (2001). Payday advance credit in America: An analysis of 
consumer demand (Monograph No. 35). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 
McDonough School of Business, Credit Research Center. Retrieved December 18, 2007 
from http://www.business.gwu.edu/research/centers/fsrp/pdf/Mono35.pdf 
Glaeser, E. L. & Scheinkman, J. A. (1998). Neither a borrower nor a lender be: An economic 
analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws. Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 1-36. 
Office of the State Bank Commissioner (n.d.). Payday and title lending information. Consumer 
and Mortgage Lending Division. Received from Dr. John Grable, February 23, 2007. 
Persky, J. (2007). Retrospectives: From usury to interest. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 
227-236. 
Posner, E. A. (1995). Contract law in the welfare state: A defense of the unconscionability 
doctrine, usury laws and related limitations on the freedom to contract. Journal of Legal 
Studies, 24, 283-319. 
Reed, C. G. & Bekar, C. T. (2003). Religious prohibitions against usury. Explorations in 
Economic History, 40, 347-368. 
Seabright, P. (2004). The company of strangers: A natural history of economic life. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Smith, J. A. (2005). Banking the unbanked. Retrieved April 27, 2007 from the University of 
North Carolina Center for Community Capitalism, Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise 
Web site: http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/cccUnbanked.ppt 
Stegman, M. A. & Faris, R. (2003). Payday lending: A business model that encourages chronic 
borrowing. Economic Development Quarter, 17, 8-32. 
Short-term Consumer Cash Loans 15 
Texas Public Interest Research Group. (n.d.). Predatory Lending. Retrieved on May 7, 2007 from 
http://www.texpirg.org/TX.asp?id2=18331&id3=TX& 
Visser, W. A. M. & MacIntosh, A. (1998). A short review of the historical critique of usury. 
Accounting, Business and Financial History, 8, 175-189. 
